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CASE NOTES .
stantial threat" test, and federal action would necessarily be made con-
tingent on the inadequacy of state action, in harmony with the design
of Congress.
GARY H. BARNES
Labor Law—National Labor Relations Act—Section Ei(b) (1)(B)
—Union Discipline of Supervisory Employees for Strikebreaking
Activities—IBEW v. NLRB (Ill. Bell Tel. Co.) 1—The members
of Local 134, IBEW, initiated an economic strike against their em-
ployer, the Illinois Bell Telephone Company.° In an effort to combat the
effects of this strike, Bell strongly encouraged its foremen and super-
visory employees to remain at work during the strike.° However,
because of a contractual union security provision that required super-
visory employees to be union members, Bell felt that any decision to
work or to respect the strike should be left to the personal discretion of
the foremen.4 Although Bell did not discipline those supervisors who
respected the strike, the company nevertheless left no doubt as to its
real wishes .° In an attempt to thwart any strikebreaking on the part
of the foremen, the union, prior to the strike, informed them that they
would be subject to union disciplinary action if they performed rank-
and-file work during the work stoppage .° In spite of the union's ad-
monitions, several supervisors reported to perform rank-and-file work
during the strike? In conformance with its pre-strike warning, the
union initiated disciplinary proceedings against those supervisor-
members who threatened the union's economic solidarity by engaging
in rank-and-file work. 8
 Several fines, ranging from $500 to $1000, were
imposed; the extent of each fine was determined by the degree of in-
volvement in the strikebreaking activity .°
The Bell Supervisors' Protective Association, which had been
formed by the foremen to protect the rights of those who chose to work
during the strike, filed unfair labor practice charges with the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in response to the union's disciplinary
measures." The Association alleged' that the imposition of the fines
constituted a violation of section 8 (b) (1) (B) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), which provides that "Mt shall be an unfair
1 — F.2d —, 81 L.R.R.M. 2257 (D.C. Cir. 1972).








 Id. at 2259.
10
 IBEW (Ill. Bell Tel. Co.), 192 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 77 L.R.R.M. 1610 (1971).
11
 77 L.R.R.M. at 1611,
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labor practice- for a labor organization or its agents—(1) to restrain
or coerce . . . (B) an employer in the selection of his representatives
for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of griev-
ances."12
 The Board concluded that because the foremen's duties con-
formed to the definition of "supervisors" contained within section
2 (11) of the NLRA," the foremen were employer representatives
within the meaning of section 8 (b) (1) (B). 14 The Board therefore
found the union's disciplinary actions violative of 8 (b) (1) (B)." The
Board issued a cease and desist order and rescinded the fines." On
review, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, endorsing
the Board's decision, HELD: union discipline directed against foremen
for performing rank-and-file work during a strike constitutes union re-
straint and coercion of the employer in the selection of the employer's
bargaining representatives in violation of section 8(b) (1) (B) of the
NLRA.17 In reaching this decision, the court interpreted section
8 (b) ( 1) (B) as proscribing not only direct union interference with an
employer's selection of its collective bargaining agent but indirect inter-
ference as well." Hence the court concluded that the imposition of
these fines by the union, albeit for activity which was not literally
supervisory in nature, constituted the type of restraint and coercion of
the employer that section 8(b) (1) (B) was designed to prevent."
To determine the validity of the court's conclusions, this note will
first examine the nature of permissible union discipline, utilizing both
legislative and judicial developments to explore the limits of the doc-
'trine that a union may legitimately enforce its internal rules upon its
members unless such action contravenes an express element of national
labor policy. This initial discussion will provide a foundation for the
second part of the note which will examine the often ambiguous status
of supervisors and will demonstrate that the national policy of pro-
tecting supervisors from union discipline is operative only when the
employer's agent is acting in a supervisory capacity. It will be sub-
mitted that the majority's definition of supervisory responsibilities is
excessively broad and that accordingly the national labor policy of
12 29 U.S.C. 4 158(b) (1) (B) (1970).
13 Section 2(11) provides:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest
of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge,
assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to
adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection
with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970).
18 d14 Id.
at 6L.R.R.M. at 1612-13.
12 Id.





immunizing supervisors from union discipline is inapplicable in this
case.
Union Discipline
The controversial question of permissible union discipline was
dealt with extensively by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Allis-
Chalmers." That case attempted to resolve many of the ambiguities
arising out of the apparently conflicting provisions of section 7 of the
NLRA,2' which permits a union member "to refrain from" concerted
activity, and the proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A), 22 which allows a union
to promulgate internal rules and regulations which may sometimes in-
fringe upon the rights guaranteed by section 7. In Allis-Chalmers, the
Court found that a union which imposed fines and then brought suit
for their collection against members who had violated a picket line and
had continued to work during a duly authorized strike did not violate
section 8(b) (1) (A), which makes it an unfair labor practice for unions
to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their section 7 right
to refrain from concerted activities. 23 The NLRB had found that the
union's conduct was legitimate because the proviso to section
8(b) (1) (A) states that section 8(b) ( 1) (A) "shall not impair the
right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules" 24 of member-
ship." On review, the Seventh Circuit had reversed the Board, finding
that the fines did indeed constitute "restraint and coercion" within the
meaning of 8 (b) (1) (A) and that the proviso sanctioned only union
discipline in the form of expulsion from the labor organization 2° In
rejecting that holding, the Supreme' Court found the Seventh Circuit's
reading of the pertinent sections of the Act in isolation inappropriate
and pointed out that section 8 (b) (1) (A) "is only one of many inter-
woven sections in a complex Act ...."27 The Court then asserted that if
national labor policy is to be implemented effectively, a "wide range
of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative
in serving the unit it represents . . . ."28 To preserve the viability of
labor's bargaining representative, it was felt necessary to allow the
union adequate and reasonable disciplinary powers to preserve its
20 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
21 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
22 Section 8(b) (1)(A) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—(1)
to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 7: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor
organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or reten-
tion of membership therein.
29 U.S.C. 158(b)(1)(A) (1970).
28 388 U.S. at 176.
24 The text of § 8(b)(1)(A) is set out in note 22 supra.
28 388 U.S. at 178.
26 Id. at 178-79.
27 Id. at 179.
28 Id. at 18D.
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status against the threat posed by violations of the rules and regulations
governing union membership." The Court then explicitly singled out
the importance of preserving the economic strike as "the ultimate wea-
pon in labor's arsenal for achieving agreement upon its terms . . . ." 3°
The Court also noted that "the power to fine or expel strikebreakers is
essential if the union is to be an effective bargaining agent . . . ." 31
Thus the Supreme Court recognized that the preservation of the
strike as an economic weapon was an integral element of national labor
policy and that strikebreaking activity was therefore an appropriate
area for legitimate union discipline. Discipline, in such circumstances,
was not "restraint or coercion." Here it must be interjected that it is
this point that makes Allis-Chalmers vitally important to the instant
case, Electrical Workers. The words "restraint or coercion" are common
to section 8(b) (1) (B), the focal point of Electrical Workers,82
 and to
8(b) (1) (A), which Allis-Chalmers examined. Hence the latter deci-
sion's restrictive reading of the phrase—a reading that excludes from
classification as "restraint or coercion" discipline necessary to fulfill-
ment of a national labor policy—will be relevant to the analysis of
Electrical Workers given below.
In reaching its decision in Allis-Chalmers, the Supreme Court relied
heavily upon the legislative history of the Act regarding the limits of
permissible union discipline. If section 8(b) (1) (A) were read as pro-
hibiting the fining of members for strikebreaking activity, the Court
reasoned, a union would be precluded from exercising a power neces-
sary to the discharge of its role as the bargaining representative of its
members.' No longer would a union be able to use the economically
powerful strike weapon in an unimpeded fashion." Moreover, such an
interpretation, if made in conjunction with a literal reading of the
proviso to section 8 (b) (1) (A), which allows unions full control over
rules of membership, would result in an anomalous situation: a union
would be permitted to use the drastic remedy of expulsion but not the
less onerous penalties of financial discipline." In the Court's opinion,
such an extraordinary interpretation of 8 (b) (1) (A) could be supported
only by an express confirmation contained within the Act's legislative
history." The legislative history, however, contains no such confirma-
tion. Indeed, the Court felt that the statements of Senator Robert Taft,
the principal architect of the amended NLRA, supported its endorse-
ment of a union's right to fine strikebreakers!' Refuting the contention




 text at notes 64-66 infra.
as 388 U.S. at 183.
34 Id.
85 Id.
80 Id. at 184.
a4 Id. at 185, citing 93 Cong. Rec. 4193 (1947), II Legislative History of the
Labor Management Relations Act [hereinafter Leg. Inst. LMRA] 1097 -(1947).
788
CASE NOTES
that section 8(b) (2) of the NLRA38 would interfere in a union's
internal affairs and "deny it the right to protect itself against a man in
the union who betrays the objectives of the union,"3° Taft asserted:
The pending measure [section 8(b) (2)] does not pro-
pose any limitation with respect to the internal affairs of
unions. They will still be able to fire any members they wish
to fire, and they still will be able to try any of their members.
All they will not be able to do, after the enactment of this
bill, is this: If they fire a member for some other reason than
nonpayment of dues they cannot make his employer discharge
him from his job and thrOw him out of work. That is the only
result of the provision under discussion."
To the majority in Allis-Chalmers, the congressional emphasis that
section 8(b) (2) did not preclude union fines or in any way limit union
authority over internal affairs, was strong evidence that section
8(b) (1) (A) should not be read as severely infringing upon a union's
internal disciplinary authority, including its right to fine members.'
The Court found further support for the same conclusion in the legis-
lative history of section 8(b) (1) (A), which tended to support the
union's right to enforce financial disciplinary measures. Indeed, as the
Court noted, the legislative history of the NLRA indicates that the
"restraint or coercion" prohibited by section 8(b) (1) refers only to
coercive union activity involving organizational campaigns; 42 as Sena-
tor Ball said during the congressional debate: "It was never the inten-
tion of the sponsors of the pending amendment [section 8(b) (1) (A)]
to interfere with the internal affairs or organization of unions."43 Thus
the Court found in the congressional debate a clear indication that
8(b) (1) (A) was not intended either to intrude upon the domain of
internal union affairs or to impair excessively a union's ability to
enforce its rules through legitimate disciplinary measures.
Finally, the Court found additional support for its conclusions in
the 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments to the NLRA.44 In these amend-
ments, Congress explicitly provided that a union member may be
"fined, suspended, expelled or otherwise disciplined"" and disclaimed
any intent "to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and
enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member to-
ward the organization as an institution . . . ."" According to the ma-
33 29 U.S.C. * 158(b) (2) (1970).
89 388 U.S. at 185, citing 93 Cong. Rec. 4193 (1947), II Leg. Hist, LMRA 1097
(1947).
40 Id., citing 93 Cong. Rec. 4193 (1947); II Leg. Hist. LMRA 1097 (1947).
41 388 U.S. at 185.
42 Id.




73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5)	 (1970).
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2)	 (1970).
401-531 (1970).
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jority in Allis-Chalmers; the principles enunciated in these amendments
supported the validity of the union's disciplinary action." The court
concluded:
Thus, this history of congressional action does not sup-
port a conclusion that the Taft-Hartley prohibitions against
restraint or coercion of an employee to refrain from concerted
activities included a prohibition against the imposition of
fines on members who decline to honor an authorized strike
and attempts to collect such fines. Rather, the contrary infer-
ence is more justified in light of the repeated debates on
Section 8(b) (1) (A) and other sections that Congress did not
propose any limitations with respect to the internal affairs of
unions, aside from barring enforcement of a union's internal
regulations to affect a member's employment status."
Thus, in upholding the use of union discipline in Allis-Chalmers,
the Supreme Court relied not merely on the proviso to section
8(b) (1) (A) but on a broad interpretation of the words "restraint or
coercion" of section 8(b) (1) and the very substantial legislative his-
tory dealing with union discipline.
The legal principles embodied in the majority opinion in Allis-
Chalmers were broadened in Scofield v. NLRB." In Scofield, the union
levied fines upon some of its members who had violated a union rule
limiting the amount of piecework production which could be performed
in a single day." Because the rule vitally affected the interests of the
entire union membership, the Court refused to view the fines as viola-
tive of section 8 (b) (1) (A) . 51 Although the Court recognized that union
discipline could not be used as a device to affect a member's employ-
ment status or to frustrate an overriding policy of the national labor
laws, it emphasized that section 8(b) (1) left a union free to adopt
rules which would protect legitimate union interests.' In the opinion of
the majority, the fines involved pertained solely to the internal affairs
of the union and were intended to sanction an historic union animus
against unlimited piecework pay systems."
Of particular relevance to the Electrical Workers case is the dis-
cussion in Scofield of the external ramifications of the union rule limit-
ing piecework production. In Sco field, the Court explicitly noted that
the union's enforcement of its piecework rules through fines affected
not only the union and its members but the employer, as well." In the
Court's opinion, however, these external ramifications did not auto-
47 388 U.S. at 193-94.
48 388 U.S. at 195.
48 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
55 Id. at 425.
51 Id. at 426.
52 Id. at 428.
58 Id. at 431.
84 Id. at 431-32.
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matically create a violation of section 8(b) (1) (A) because the union
membership as a whole was vitally dependent upon the enforcement of
this rule." Similarly, in Electrical Workers, the court's finding that the
union discipline was objectionable because it was designed to affect
primarily the union-employer relationship and only secondarily the
union-membership relationship" did not necessarily guarantee a finding
of an 8 (b) (1) (B) violation. Indeed, the true test is not whether the
union's action has external ramifications but rather whether it violates
an express component of the national labor policy. 57
Despite the ample power afforded unions to enforce internal disci-
plinary rules, there are instances when the overall national labor policy
must preclude such enforcement. The facts of NLRB v. Marine
Workers" presented such a situation. In that case, in violation of a
provision of the union constitution, an employee bypassed established
intraunion grievance procedures and filed an unfair labor practice
charge against the union with the NLRB." Because of this violation
of established grievance procedures, the union expelled the employee
from membership and thus opened the way for the ex-member to file
an 8(b) (1) (A) charge against the union." Although recognizing that
the proviso to section 8 (b) (1) (A) assures a union the freedom to
regulate its legitimate internal affairs, the Court pointed out that a
union rule which penalizes a member for filing an unfair labor practice
charge with the Board is in direct conflict with the national labor policy
of allowing unimpeded access to the Board."' Since the maintenance of
that policy is essential to effectuation of the NLRA, a union rule which
obstructs the implementation of the policy is beyond the scope of per-
missible union discipline." As the Court said, "the proviso in Section
8(b) (1) (A) . . . is not so broad as to give the union power to penalize
a member who invokes the protection of the Act for a matter that is in
the public domain and beyond the internal affairs of the union.""
Whether the discipline involves internal union affairs, then, has
been a cardinal question in the decisions concerning union discipline."
Where disputes have arisen primarily out of matters of internal union
concern and there is no danger of a conflict with any express policy of
the national labor laws, labor organizations have long been successful
in avoiding serious governmental restrictions on the union's disciplinary
powers. Accordingly, had Electrical Workers involved exclusively in-
55 Id. at 432.
60 81 L.R.R.M. at 2264.
57 In Allis-Chalmers, the Supreme Court indicated that union discipline of strike-
breakers was itself a vital element of the national labor policy. See text at notes 30-36
supra.
58 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
69 Id. at 420-21.
00 Id. at 420.
01 Id. at 423-24.
02 Id. at 424.
08 Id. at 425.
04 For a full discussion of these cases, see text at notes 20-57 supra,
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ternal union problems the majority opinion would appear clearly
erroneous. However, unlike Scofield and Allis-Chalmers, the Electrical
Workers case was concerned with the interpretation of section
8 (b) (1) (B), which deals with the union-employer relationship, not
with section 8(b) (1) (A), which refers to the union-employee relation-
ship." The Electrical Workers majority recognized that the Supreme
Court's holdings in Allis-Chalmers and Scofield relied not on the express
language of the proviso to section 8 (b) (1) (A) but rather on a restric-
tive interpretation of the words "restraint or coercion" which are
common to both subsections of section 8 (b) (1) ." It would seem, then,
that the rationale of those decisions would apply to the 8 (b) (1) (B)
issue in Electrical Workers. However, because the Electrical Workers
majority felt that the Court had also drawn "cogent support" for its
decisions from the proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A), it concluded that the
principles in Allis-Chalmers and Scofield were inapplicable to the situa-
tion in Electrical Workers."
The majority in Electrical Workers felt that in Allis-Chalmers and
Scofield the principal relationship involved was that between the union
and its members, whereas in Electrical Workers the impact of the
disciplinary measures primarily affected the union-employer relation-
ship." Such external ramifications placed the union's actions beyond
the scope of permissible activity as outlined by the -Supreme Court in
Allis-Chalmers and Scofield." The court also felt that because section
8 (b) (1) (B) was intended to regulate external relationships, any dis-
cussion of the right of a labor organization to govern its own internal
affairs, such as that found in Allis-Chalmers and Scofield,7° would be
irrelevant on the facts of Electrical Workers." Although the majority
thus grounded its decision on a test looking to whether the effects of the
union discipline were external or internal—an erroneous test72—the
result in Electrical Workers arguably is correct if one accepts that the
union discipline of the supervisor-strikebreakers violates national labor
policy."
In a well-reasoned dissent, Judge Skelly Wright successfully—it
is submitted—refuted the majority's rationale. In the first place, he
found Allis-Chalmers applicable since the Supreme Court had based its
holding on its interpretation of the words "restraint or coercion," which
are common to subsections (A) and (B) of section 8 (b) (1). 74 While
65 81 L.R.R.M. at 2263.
as Id.
87 Id. at 2264.
88 Id.
09 Id.
70 See discussion in text at notes 33-41 supra.
71 81 L.R.R.M. at 2264
72 Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1969). See text at notes 54-57 supra.
78 NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1968). See text at notes 85-130
infra.
74 81 L.R.R.M. at 2276.
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recognizing that internal union rules could not take precedence over
clearly defined national labor policy, Wright asserted that there is "no
overriding policy of the labor laws which prohibits reasonable union
fines against members who cross a lawful picket line to perform rank-
and-file struck work."'"
The majority in Electrical Workers had drawn support for its dis-
missal of Allis-Chalmers from the Supreme Court's utilization of the
8 (b) (1) (A) proviso permitting a union to prescribe its own rules of
membership—a factor clearly inapplicable in Electrical Workers. The
dissent found this distinction highly chimerical, especially in light of
the Supreme Court's explicit disclaimer of any reliance on the proviso."
As Justice Black pointed out in his dissent in Allis -Chalmers: "Since
the union resorted to the courts to enforce its fines instead of relying
on its own internal sanctions such as expulsion from membership, the
Court correctly assumes that the proviso to 8 (b)(1)(A) cannot be read
to authorize its holding."77 It should also be noted that Judge
MacKinnon, the author of the majority opinion in Electrical Workers,
had sanctioned this interpretation of the Allis-Chalmers rationale in
his earlier opinion in Booster Lodge No. 405 v. NLRB." Describing
this rationale, he stated: "Instead of relying on the express language
of the proviso, . . . the Supreme Court carefully analyzed the entire
legislative history of Section 8(b) (1) (A), and it concluded that Con-
gress did not intend to prohibit such internal union discipline by the
prohibition against 'restraint' or 'coercion.' " Thus, the majority's
attempt to distinguish Allis-Chalmers from Electrical Workers on the
basis of the proviso to section 8 (b) (I) (A) is on very weak ground.
Judge Wright also rejected the majority's use of the internal-
external distinction to support the finding of an 8(b) (1) (B) violation."
The union rule upheld in Allis-Chalmers, he asserted, had an external
effect upon the employer.' By deterring strikebreakers, the rule as-
sured union solidarity and thereby allowed the union to bring greater
economic pressure upon the employer. 82 Indeed, as the dissent noted,
the very purpose of a union is to affect the external relationship existing
between the employer and his employees as it expresses itself in the
75 Id. See discussion in text at notes 30-48 supra.
70 81 L.R.R.M. at 2277, citing 388 U.S. at 184.
77 388 U.S. at 200 (emphasis added).
78 459 F.2d 1143, 79 L.R.R.M. 2443 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
70 Id. at 1149, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2446. See also Gould, Some Limitations Upon
Union Discipline Under the National Labor Relations Act: The Radiations of Allis-
Chalmers, 1970 Duke L.J. 1067, 1128-29. Gould asserts that the failure of Congress to
attach the proviso to * 8(b)(1)(B) does not establish the conclusion that a union's
internal affairs are excluded from consideration under that subsection. Gould also feels
that the Court's reliance on words common to both subsections 8(b) (1) (A) and (B)
indicates that unions may legitimately fine supervisor-members for the performance of
rank-and-file work during a strike.
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adversarial process of collective bargaining." In Scofield, the Supreme
Court explicitly recognized that the union fines affected the interests of
the employer as well as the union and its members." In sum, it is sub-
mitted that the irrelevance of the internal-external test, as well as the
strong national policy of permitting a union to discipline its members
for strikebreaking activity, requires the conclusion that the fines in
Electrical Workers should have been upheld. However, because super-
visory employees are immune from union "restraint or coercion" when
acting in their managerial capacity, it is necessary to examine in detail
the circumstances under which they may legitimately be disciplined by
a labor organization.
Supervisory Personnel
Supervisors, as occupiers of an intermediate position between labor
and management, have continually upset the equilibrium of the na-
tional labor policy insofar as the subject of union discipline is con-
cerned. To the sponsors of the Taft-Hartley Act," the position of the
supervisor in labor-management relations posed particular problems.
Although supervisors had been regarded as part of management before
the passage of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA in 1947,
labor organizations had waged successful campaigns to force super-
visors to join unions." The supervisors were then in the awkward posi-
tion of being obligated to maintain membership in organizations com-
posed of workers whom they had been hired to supervise." This situa-
tion undermined the balance of power in the collective bargaining
process," insofar as the unions were able to coerce their supervisor-
members into subordinating management's interests to those of the
union whenever a conflict arose between management and rank-and-
file workers." Employers were subject to deprivation of many impor-
tant rights, including the undivided loyalty of their foremen: "They
[employers], as well as workers, are entitled to loyal representatives in
the plants, but when the foremen unionize . . . they are subject to influ-
ence and control by the rank and file union, and, instead of their boss-
ing the rank and file, the rank and file bosses them."" -
The addition of section 8(b) (1) (B) by the 1947 amendments was
designed to prevent unions from dictating to an employer who should be
the employer's representative in either the collective bargaining process
or the settlement of employee grievances." No longer would a union be
83 Id.
84 394 U.S. at 431-32.
88 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
86 S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1947); I Leg. Hist. LMRA 407 (1947).
87 S. Rep. No. 105, supra note 88, at 3; I Leg. Hist. LMRA at 409.
88 Id.; I Leg. Hist. LMRA at 409.
80 Id. at ; I Leg. Hist. LMRA at 411.
so H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); I Leg. Hist. LMRA at 305
(1947).
DI 93 Cong. Rec. 4266 (1947); II Leg. Hist. LMRA at 1077.
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permitted to force an employer to change foremen or to assert a veto
power over the appointment of a management representative who, in
the union's view, was too strict with his subordinates." However, as
Senator Taft noted, the added protection from union discipline which
section 8(b) (1) (B) gave to supervisory employees did not limit the
power of the unions to regulate their own internal affairs." This power,
of course, was inherently in tension, if not in conflict, with the limits
placed on that power by section 8(b) (1) (B) vis-à-vis supervisory em-
ployees. The position of those employees remained necessarily am-
biguous.
Although section 14(a) of the NLRA" allows supervisors to be-
come union members, their position is not identical to that of the
rank-and-file employee. For example, an employer is free to insist that
his supervisory personnel be excluded from union membership.° 5 Also,
sections 2(3) and 2 (11) of the NLRA indicate the different roles
occupied by supervisors and rank-and-file employees." These roles
were examined in Meat Cutters Local 81 v. NLRB," a case in which
the union had fined several supervisors for implementing a new com-
pany policy which the union considered inimical to the interests of
its membership." The court rejected the union's contention that sec-
tion 14(a) placed supervisor-members under the full control of their
respective unions." Recognizing the conflicting obligations of foremen
as representatives of the employer on the one hand and as members
of the union on the other, the court found that section 2(3) indicated
a congessional intent that the obligations to the employer should be
paramount.'" Because section 2(3) excepted supervisors from the
protection afforded by the NLRA, an employer was free to discharge
any disloyal supervisory personnel.m Thus the court concluded that
02 Id.
05 93 Cong. Rec. at 4318 (1947); II Leg. Hist. LMRA at 1097.
94 Section 14(a), 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1970), provides:
Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from be-
coming or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer subject
to this subchapter shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as
supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local,
relating to collective bargaining.
95 International Typographical Union v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 6, 46 L.R.R.M. 2132 (1st
Cir. 1960). In this case, the court found the union in violation of § 8(b)(1)(B) be-
cause of the union's attempt to compel the employer to agree to a clause which would
have required all supervisory personnel to become members of the labor organization.
Id. at 11-12, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2137.
95 Section 2(3) provides, in part: "The term 'employee' shall include any employee,
... but shall not include • . any individual employed as a supervisor .. . ." 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(3) (1970). The text of § 2(11) is set out in note 13 supra.
97 458 F.2d 794, 79 L.R.R.M. 2309 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
98 Id. at 796-97, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2310.
" Id. at 799, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2311.
100 Id. at 800, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2312.
101 Id.
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any fealty which a supervisor might owe his union must be relegated
to a secondary position whenever it detracts from the absolute duty,
evidenced by section 8(b) (1) (B), which the supervisor owes his em-
ployer when exercising his managerial prerogative.' 02
However, the extent of loyalty owed an employer by a supervisor-
member is absolute only when a matter of managerial concern is
involved. In Meat Cutters, the majority explicitly avoided a flat pro-
hibition against all union discipline of supervisory employees. 103 The
court reasoned that only when the supervisor's obligations to the
union conflict with the exercise of his managerial responsibilities did
the prohibition embodied in section 8(b) (1) (B) come into play."'
Thus the court in Meat Cutters issued an explicit caveat:
The rule here applied by the Board only affects union
discipline which is imposed upon a member, who has respon-
sibilities as a representative of his employer in administering
the collective bargaining agreement or the adjustment of em-
ployee grievances, because he has performed duties as a man-
agement representative!"
As Judge Wright stressed in his dissent in Electrical Workers, a union
can legally discipline a supervisor-member for acts which are not
performed by the individual in the furtherance of his obligations as
the employer's representative in the collective bargaining or grievance
adjustment processes!"
In Electrical Workers, however, there was no finding that the su-
pervisors were disciplined with an intent to influence the exercise of
their managerial responsibilities; rather, they were disciplined for per-
forming rank-and-file work during a duly authorized strike. 107 It is
submitted that this fact, together- with the refusal on the part of
Congress's and the NLRB"° to promulgate a per se ban on all union
discipline of supervisory employees, raises questions concerning the
correctness of the majority opinion in Electrical Workers.
Section 8(b) (1) (B) has been successfully invoked to proscribe
unacceptable union interference designed to influence the employer's
selection of his supervisory personnel. In many instances, there is
little doubt that the union is "restraining or coercing" the employer
102 Id.
108 Id. at 799, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2311; see Brief for NLRB at 15, Meat Cutters
Local 81 v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 794, 79 L.R.R.M. 2309 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
104 458 F.2d at 799, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2311.
105 Id. at 798-99, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2311.
1°6 81 L.R.R.M. at 2273,
107 Id. at 2272.
1°B Read together, 8(b)(1), which permits a union to discipline its members, and
14(a), which allows supervisors to become union members, indicate the permissibility
of union discipline of supervisory employees. 29 U.S.C. 	 158(b)(1), 164(a) (1970).
100 Brief for NLRB at 15, Meat Cutters Local 81 v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 794, 79
L.R.R.M. 2309 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
796
CASE NOTES
in the selection of his collective bargaining representative.'" How-
ever, most section 8(b) (1) (B) cases do not involve clear-cut factual
circumstances; rather, they necessitate intricate analyses of conflict-
ing loyalties."' The problem, then, is to determine whether the em-
ployees' activity involves the exercise of supervisory responsibilities
as delineated by sections 8 (b) (1) (B) and 2 (11) of the NLRA." 2
It was this problem that faced the Electrical Workers court. Ac-
cording to the majority, the union's actions interfered with the ab-
solute duty, evidenced by section 8(b) (1) (B), which the supervisor
owes his employer when exercising his managerial authority."a Al-
though the employer did not require the supervisors to report to work
during the strike, Bell clearly hoped that the supervisors would choose
to break the strike and perform rank-and-file work in place of the
striking employees.'" By reporting to work under these circumstances,
the supervisors exhibited an attitude which placed the interests of the
employer over that of the union."" Discipline for such a choice, in
the majority's opinion, constituted a violation of section 8(b) (1)
(B)."° In essence, the union was attempting to interfere with the
performance of duties to which the employer was entitled. To reach
this conclusion, the court construed the activity as falling within
the scope of supervisory responsibilities protected by section 8(b)
(1) (B)."7 During a strike, the ability to continue plant operations
by assigning supervisory personnel to do rank-and-file work greatly
enhances the employer's bargaining position."a Thus, activity by su-
pervisors which under ordinary circumstances could not possibly be
considered managerial in scope, was encompassed in the majority's
110 See, e.g., Los Angeles Cloak, 127 N.L.R.B. 1543, 46 L.R.R.M. 1235 (1960). In
this case, the Board found that a union strike designed to produce the removal of the
employer's bargaining representative constituted a violation of § 8(b) (1) (B). 127 NLRB
at 1544, 1547, 46 L.R.R.M. at 1235.
111 A number of cases illustrate the difficulty that the courts and the Board face
in determining whether there is a § 8(b) (1) (B) violation. See, e.g., N.M. Carpenters,
176 N.L.R.B. 797, 71 L.R.R.M. 1445 (1969); Toledo Locals No. 15, 175 N.L.R.B. 1072,
71 L.R.R.M. 1467 (1969); San Francisco -Oakland Mailers, 180 N.L.R.B. 33, 69
L.R.R.M. 1157 (1968). The majority in Electrical Workers relied heavily on Oakland
Mailers. 81 L.R.R.M. at 2260-61. In that case, the Board found that the union's disci-
plinary measures were an indirect method of requiring the supervisory personnel to be
more amenable to the union's viewpoint regarding the administration of the collective
bargaining agreement. This union pressure constituted a violation of § 8(b)(1)(B). 180
N.L.R.B. at 39, 69 L.R.R.M. at 1158-59.
112 Section 2(11) enumerates the characteristic duties of supervisory personnel,
thus providing the Board and the courts with the statutory framework necessary to
determine whether a particular action falls within the scope of managerial responsibility.
The text of § 2(11) is set out in note 13 supra.
113 81 L.R.R.M. at 2262.
114 Id. at 2265.
113 Id.
110 Id.
117 Id, at 2266.
118 Id.
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broad definition of supervisory responsibility for the purposes of sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(B).
It is submitted, however, that because there is no per se ban on
all union discipline of supervisor-members who violate union rules in
areas unrelated to their managerial duties, the Electrical Workers
court's interpretation of section 8 (b) (1) (B) must be closely scruti-
nized. In his dissent in Electrical Workers, Judge Wright performed
this detailed examination. He emphasized that union discipline of
supervisory personnel in areas unrelated to their managerial duties is
permissible despite the danger that such discipline could indirectly
cause a supervisor to be more responsive to union demands than to
his employer in the collective bargaining process."° This position ob-
viously runs counter to the majority's assertion that the supervisor
owes his. employer undivided loyalty in virtually all matters. 12° Yet,
a flat prohibition against all union discipline of supervisors which
would seem to flow from the position that the employer can demand
undivided loyalty could produce inequitable results. The supervisor
would have all the benefits of union membership without having to
bear any of the responsibilities. Accordingly Judge Wright endorsed
the argument made by the Board in its brief in Meat Cutters that
"[i]t is only when the representative's obligations to the union con-
flict with his management responsibilities that his union obligations
are compelled to yield.”121 In Wright's opinion, the fines levied against
supervisors for the performance of ordinary rank-and-file work could
not possibly be considered within the ambit of typical managerial
responsibilities.' 22 As the trial examiner in Electrical Workers had
pointed out, the cases which have found section 8(b) (1) (B) viola-
dims were "readily distinguishable [from the situation] here where
the action for which the supervisors were fined bore no direct relation
to their work as supervisors or to any interpretation of the contract." 123
Similarly, as Member Fanning said in his dissent to the Board's find-
ing of a violation:
the supervisors were not fined because they gave directions to
the work force, interpreted the collective bargaining agree-
ment;adjusted grievances, or performed any other functions
generally related to supervisory activities, in a manner in dis-
favor with Respondent Union. They were fined because they
performed production work in the bargaining unit during a
iis Id, at 2272. See also Painters, Local 453, 183 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 74 L.R.R.M.
1539 (1970). Here the Board refused to invalidate union fines of several foremen for
performing rank-and-file work. The Board said that an 8(b)(1)(B) violation was im-
possible when the union discipline stemmed from matters far removed from the general
definition of supervisory responsibilities. 74 L.R.R.M. at 1540.
120 81 L.R.R.M. at 2273.
121 Id., citing Brief for NLRB at 15, Meat Cutters Local 81 v. NLRB, 458 F.2d
794, 79 L.R.R.M. 2309 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
122 81 L.R.R.M. at 2273.
123 192 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 77 L.R.R.M. 1610, 1612 (1971).
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strike. Their Employer sought to use them, not in the direc-
tion of the work of employees who had not gone on strike
or of replacements for strikers, but to replace the strikers
themselves. In short, he assigned them to work as employees
within the meaning of Section 2 (3) of the Act, not as super-
visors within the meaning of Section 2 (11) of the Act. . . .
If the fine of an employee-member for engaging in strike-
breaking does not restrain or coerce within the meaning of
Section 8 (b) (1), I cannot see how the same restraint im-
posed upon a supervisor-member for the same activity can
be broadened into restraint or coercion of the employer within
the meaning of that section. All the restraint does, if success-
ful, is deny the employer the use of the supervisor as a pro-
duction worker during the strike. 124
The Electrical Workers majority never precisely defined the term
"management function" which it used to identify activity protected
by section 8(b) (1) (B) . 125 The court stressed, however, that the proper
test for such activity is not whether the supervisors acted pursuant
to a management order, but rather whether their actions were under-
taken in the interests of management.'2° To the extent that manage-
ment and labor are viewed as adversaries, it is always in management's
interest for supervisors to take actions. which weaken the union. This
broad application of section 8(b) (1) (B), the dissent argued, is in-
consistent with the statutory, judicial, and common sense meanings
of "managerial functions" which had previously been determinative
in such cases.'" According to the dissent, none of the activity for
which the supervisors were fined fag within the description of su-
pervisory functions contained within the NLRA.'28 Arguably, at the
time of the infraction, these personnel were not supervisors within
the meaning of the NLRA and hence not within the ambit of section
8 (b) (1) (B). Also, it would seem that section 8(b) (1) (B) permits a
union to insist that supervisor-members meet their obligations to the
union in matters non-managerial in scope.'29
It is submitted, then, that the majority's exceedingly broad defi-
nition of "supervisory responsibilities" resulted in an improper finding
of an 8 (b) (1) (B) violation. Although supervisors are immune from
union discipline when acting in managerial capacities, there is no
national labor policy which forbids fines of the type levied in Electri-
cal Workers when the supervisors are not acting in their roles of
124 77 L.R.R.M. at 1614.
128 81 L.R.R.M. at 2262, 2266.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 2279.
128 Id. at 2274. Supervisory functions are described in § 2(11), the text of which
is set out in note 13 supra.
129 81 L.R.R.M. at 2274.
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employer representatives for the "purpose of collective bargaining or
the adjustment of employee grievances.""°
Conclusion
It would appear that the result in Electrical Workers rests on
inadequate reasoning regarding the scope of section 8 (b) (1) (B) as
determined by the Board and courts in earlier decisions. Although
the majority hesistantly recognized the validity of union discipline in
some cases involving supervisors, it insisted that the absolute duty
of loyalty owed by supervisors in the exercise of managerial responsi-
bilities, together with its finding that the performance of rank-and-file
struck work constituted such an exercise, necessitated a finding of an
8(b) (1) (B) violation.
It is submitted, however, that the majority in Electrical Workers
adopted an overly narrow view of the extent of permissible union
discipline. As illustrated by the Supreme Court's decisions in Allis-
Chalmers and Scofield, a union may legitimately enforce its internal
rules and regulations unless such action would contravene an express
element of the national labor laws. Although these cases involved an
interpretation of section 8(b) (1) (A) rather than 8(b) (1) (B), the
essential principles arguably remain the same for both since the de-
cisions by the Supreme Court in Scofield and Allis-Chalmers rested
upon the words "restraint or coercion" which are common to both
subsections (A) and (B) of section 8(b) (1). Finally, it should be
noted that the performance of rank-and-file work during a strike does
not fall within the definition of supervisory responsibilities as con-
tained in section 2 (11) of the NLRA. Because the fines were levied
by the union for activities not supervisory in nature, there can be no
conflict with any provision of the national labor laws designed to pro-
tect supervisors from union discipline when acting in their managerial
capacities. It is submitted that the majority in Electrical Workers
erred when they allowed the supervisors to retain all the benefits of
union membership without incurring any proportionate obligations.
DANIEL M. CRANE
Labor Law—Section S(b) (7) (C) of the NLRA—Recognitional
Picketing—Temporary Injunction Pursuant to Section 10(1) of the
NLRA—Samog v. Building & Construction Trades Council (Samuel
E. Long, Inc. ). 1--Respondent labor organization' picketed a nonunion
120 29 U.S.C. § 1Ss(b)(1) (E) (1970).
1 346 F. Supp. 1071, 80 L.R.R.M. 3358 (F.D. Pa. 1972).
2 Respondent is an unincorporated association whose membership is comprised of
delegates from craft unions and councils in the construction industry, and is a labor
organization within the meaning of 2(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
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